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Recent fiscal policies, including the 2008 stimulus payments and the 2009 Making Work Pay tax credit,
aimed to increase household spending. This paper quantifies the spending response to these policies
and examines differences in spending by whether the stimulus was delivered as a one-time payment
or as a flow of payments from reduced withholding. Based on responses from a representative sample
of households in the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, the paper finds
that the reduction in withholding in 2009 boosted spending at roughly half the rate (13 percent) as
the one-time payments (25 percent) in 2008.
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jslemrod@umich.eduFiscal stimulus during economic downturns has been a prominent feature of economic policy in 
the first decade of the new millennium. Payments to households by different mechanisms have 
been central to these stimulus policies.  In 2001, households received a tax rebate paid by paper 
check.  In 2008, households received economic stimulus payments in the form of a paper check 
or electronic funds transfer.  In 2009, working households had a reduction in income tax 
withholding corresponding to a tax credit, while retiree households received a one-time payment.  
  When the economic stimulus package was being considered in early 2009, economists 
and policymakers pondered whether a reduction in withholding would deliver more immediate 
economic stimulus via higher spending per dollar than would one-time payments.  Although the 
delivery mechanism is immaterial in a standard economic model with rational and unconstrained 
consumers, it might matter if, for example, many households follow rules of thumb or use mental 
accounts, if the awareness of a change in after-tax income depends on how it is delivered, or if 
the delivery mechanism affects expectations about future taxes.  
In this paper we use household survey responses to answer the question of whether the 
delivery mechanism of fiscal stimulus affects whether the extra income is spent or saved on 
receipt.  The 2008 stimulus payments and the 2009 reduction in withholding were implemented 
under very different macroeconomic conditions.  Separately identifying the effects of different 
delivery mechanisms from the effects of changing economic conditions presents a challenge.  
Our research design has multiple approaches to address this identification problem.  First, our 
survey asks about the spending response in 2009 to the actual retiree payments as well as to 
hypothetical one-time payments. By simultaneously asking the same households about a series of 
actual and hypothetical policies, we can isolate the effect of delivery mechanism from changes in 
aggregate and individual economic conditions across time.  Second, we analyze open-ended, free 
responses to provide greater resolution on why people respond differently depending on how an 
increase in disposable income is delivered.  Third, we use variation in how economic conditions 
changed across respondents from 2008 to 2009 to control for the effect of economic conditions 
in explaining the response to the rebate versus the response to the change in withholding.   
We find that the spending out of an increase in after-tax income was lower for reductions 
in withholding—barely half as much—than for one-time payments.  Just 13 percent of 
households said that the 2009 tax credit would lead them to mostly increase their spending—
roughly half of the mostly-spend rate of 25 percent for the 2008 tax rebates.  Yet, the spend rates  
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for the tax rebates in 2008 and hypothetical and actual one-time payments in 2009 were similar; 
this fact provides further evidence on the importance of the delivery mechanism. Tabulations of 
additional survey questions, regression analysis using data from earlier surveys, and qualitative 
analysis of the free-response questions all confirm a smaller stimulative effect from a change in 
withholding compared to a one-time payment.  The deterioration in household economic 
conditions also potentially affected the spending response to the Making Work Pay tax credit.  
We explore this hypothesis by examining how changes in financial conditions and the local 
unemployment rates affect the household response to the stimulus policies.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I discusses the design of 
recent stimulus policies that provide extra income to households and why the delivery 
mechanism for the extra income might matter for behavior.  Section II describes the survey.  
Section III presents results.  Section IV discusses related empirical findings. Section V offers a 
concluding discussion of how these results inform debates over the design of fiscal policies. 
 
I.  Mechanism of Payment and the Design of Policies 
A.  The Stimulus Policies 
The policies underlying the rebates and credits in 2001, 2008, and 2009 were quite different.  
The 2001 rebate was an “advanced payment” of the benefit of a new 10 percent tax bracket for a 
portion of taxable income that was previously taxed at 15 percent.  The 2001 tax cut legislation 
instituted the 10 percent bracket for 10 years (2001 to 2010).  The intention of its supporters was 
that it would later be made permanent and, indeed, it was extended into 2011.  The 2008 rebate 
was a one-time “stimulus payment.”  Although administered through the tax system, the rebate 
was not related to any change in tax policy.  The 2009 change in withholding resulted from the 
enactment of the Making Work Pay tax credit, which for most workers effectively provided a 
lump-sum income tax credit for two years.  .  Although the Fiscal Year 2010 budget proposal 
introduced in early 2009 would have made the Making Work Pay credit permanent,
1 it did expire 
at the end of 2010 as provided for in the original stimulus legislation.   
Hence, the payments in 2001, 2008, and 2009 differed substantially in how they related 
to tax liabilities over time.  The 2001 and 2009 policies are somewhat comparable because they 
were more directly related to the income tax.  Moreover, for most workers the tax liability 
                                                 
1 Office of Management and Budget (2009, p. 17).  
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changes associated with the rebate in 2001 and the change in withholding in 2009 were lump 
sum, i.e., did not change a marginal tax rate.
2  The 2008 stimulus was a one-time payment 
unrelated to tax liabilities.  While the Making Work Pay tax credit applied only to workers, the 
stimulus package in 2009 also provided one-time payments to certain non-workers, for example, 
retirees receiving Social Security benefits.  Hence, the stimulus packages in 2008 and 2009 
provide an opportunity for comparing the effect on spending of one-time payments to the effect 
of changes in withholding.   
The mechanism for the delivery of fiscal stimulus is part of the design of the policy.  At 
different times, policymakers use changes in withholding or one-time payments to distribute the 
stimulus.  In 2008, policymakers chose an economic stimulus through the mechanism of a one-
time, highly visible payment.  The 2008 stimulus payment was designed to provide rapid 
stimulus in tandem with the sharp cuts in interest rates by the Federal Open Market Committee in 
order to head off a recession (see Economic Report of the President 2009, Box 1-1).  Moreover, 
the 2008 stimulus payments were not closely linked to the tax system, except administratively, so 
it was much more natural to disburse them as a rebate than as a change in withholding.
3   
In 2009, policymakers chose to disburse gradually the stimulus through a much less 
visible change in withholding.  In contrast to the notion that the 2008 rebate would “jump-start” 
an economy teetering on the edge of falling into recession, the 2009 tax credit was designed as a 
two-year policy that was part of a policy of extended fiscal stimulus in the face of a severe and 
                                                 
2 Most taxpayers have taxable incomes that put them above the 10% bracket ($12,000 for couples), so the benefit of 
the 10% bracket is largely a fixed dollar amount, so the 2001 advanced payment was a lump sum.  Similarly, most 
taxpayers have at least the amount of earnings ($12,900 for couples) for which the Making Work Pay credit reaches 
its limit, and less than the amount where the phase out begins ($150,000 for couples), so the 2009 Making Work Pay 
tax credit is also a lump sum.  
3 As mentioned, the 2001 tax rebates corresponded to an advance payment of the benefit of a new, 10 percent tax 
bracket for the first $12,000 of taxable income ($6,000 for singles) for a portion of taxable income that was 
previously taxed at 15 percent.  It would have been straightforward to implement this change in tax rates as a change 
in withholding.  Indeed, the cuts in the marginal tax rates that applied to the upper tax brackets were in fact 
implemented as a change in the withholding tables effective July, 2001.  Instead, the benefit of the 10 percent 
bracket in 2001 was distributed as a rebate; the withholding tables were adjusted for the new 10 percent bracket as 
of January, 2002.  Hence, policymakers made an explicit choice to use the rebate mechanism in 2001.  The 2001 
rebate was part of a significant change in tax rates that was proposed by the Bush Administration before the 
recession for reasons not related to economic stimulus.  As the tax changes worked through Congress, it became 
clearer that the economy was slowing, so the idea of the rebate was introduced to provide a visible short-term 
stimulus as a part of the longer-term change in tax policy.  The Economic Report of the President, issued early in 
2002, does not distinguish between the rebates and the much smaller in aggregate changes in withholding.  “The 
timing of these reductions in withholding and rebates proved propitious:  They added substantial economic stimulus 
by boosting purchasing power in the hands of consumers during a period of sluggish economic activity” (Economic 
Report of the President 2002, p. 44)  See Shapiro and Slemrod (2003b) for further discussion of the CEA analysis of 
the 2001 rebate.  
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likely protracted downturn.    Because the Making Work Pay tax credit was integrated into the 
tax system, it was natural to implement it as a change in withholding.  The chair of the Council 
of Economic Advisers (CEA), Christina Romer, (2009) and the Economic Report of the 
President (2010, p. 52) make explicit the aim of spreading the stimulus over several years. 
 
B.  Why Might the Delivery Mechanism Affect Spending? 
While the form of the 2009 stimulus was being debated, some economists and commentators 
suggested that households were more likely to spend from a small, sustained increase in take-
home pay than from a large, one-time rebate.  In this subsection, we discuss possible reasons to 
think that the delivery mechanism might matter. 
Mental accounts.—Richard Thaler’s formulation of the role of mental accounts figured 
prominently in the discussion of the likely effects of the 2009 tax credit.  Thaler (1992, p. 109) 
describes three broad accounts for wealth—a current income account, an asset account, and a 
future income account—and argues that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of the 
first account is close to one, the MPC from the last account is close to zero, and the MPC from 
the middle account is somewhere in between.  Also according to Thaler (1992, p. 112), “small 
gains, relative to income, will be coded as current income, and spent.  Larger gains will enter the 
assets account, where the MPC is lower.”  If, as seems reasonable, reduced withholding is put 
into a “current income account,” the mental account framework would suggest that it generates a 
higher spend rate compared to a one-time check that is more likely to be put into an “asset 
account.”
 4  
This prediction of the mental accounting framework was taken to suggest that the 2009 
change in withholding would be more effective than a rebate at stimulating spending.  
Psychologist Barry Schwartz put it as follows: 
We can apply the lessons of mental accounting to the stimulus package. Perhaps a major 
reason why the Bush tax rebate failed to stimulate spending was that it came as a lump 
sum. Paid all at once, a rebate of $500 is real money…. But suppose, instead, it had been 
paid as a $10/week addition to your regular paycheck? Then, it would hardly be 
                                                 
4 The prediction of the mental accounts framework is supported by lab experiments reported in Chambers and 
Spencer (2008) using student subjects, who report that refunds delivered as monthly payments stimulated current 
spending more than if the same yearly total tax reduction was delivered in one lump sum.  The lab experiments of 
Epley, Mak, and Idson (2006) also suggest that the framing of a stimulus payment may affect the spending response.  
In a series of experiments, they find that income received either from the U.S. government or from a laboratory fund 
was spent more readily when it was described as bonus income compared to when it was described as returned 
income.   
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noticeable. One more latte at Starbucks. Steak instead of chicken at the restaurant. The 
ten bucks would just get absorbed into your weekly wage. You'd live a little better, and 
your money would go a little further, without you giving it a moment's thought.  What 
this implies is that if the stimulus package includes tax relief, and if we want people to 
spend the money they get, we should make sure that the money comes in ‘spendable’ 
packages. Not as a lump sum, but as dribs and drabs.
 5   
 
James Surowiecki, writing in the New Yorker magazine, made a similar argument, which was 
endorsed by Cass Sunstein and Thaler in their blog.
6   
Visibility.—One reason that the delivery mechanism of a stimulus payment may matter for the 
induced spending response is that different mechanisms have different degrees of visibility.  
There are multiple dimensions to visibility.  Most directly, a one-time rebate is, by definition, 
something unusual.
7  How a one-time payment arrives (as a check or as an electronic funds 
transfer (EFT)) may matter, as well.  While one could be passive about an EFT, one has to take 
notice of a check by depositing it.  In contrast, a change in withholding is simply an adjustment 
by one’s employer of a recurring, periodic flow. It might not be noticed, especially for 
individuals whose paycheck routinely fluctuates for other reasons (changes in hours, changes in 
deductions for benefits or other payroll deductions, etc.).  Additionally, the stimulus measures 
were accompanied by different levels of publicity.  The 2008 rebate checks were the main 
feature of the 2008 stimulus package and received substantial press attention.  Moreover, rebate 
recipients received two letters informing them of the rebate.  In contrast, the 2009 withholding 
change, although a significant part of the stimulus package, was one of its many components and 
received less press attention.  In particular, no letter was sent informing recipients of the Making 
Work Pay tax credit. 
While these behavioral arguments might have been part of the Administration’s thinking 
in designing the stimulus, we have not been able to locate any contemporaneous official 
                                                 
5 Barry Schwartz, “On the Economic Stimulus Package:  The ‘Packaging’ Counts” (February 1, 2009) 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-choices-worth-having/200902/the-economic-stimulus-package-the-
packaging-counts. 
6 James Surowiecki, “A Smarter Stimulus” New Yorker (January 26, 2009); Sunstein and Thaler, “How Behavioral 
Economics Could Show Up in the New Stimulus Package” (January 20, 2009), http://nudges.org/2009/01/20/how-
behavioral-economics-could-show-up-in-the-new-stimulus-package. 
7 While the rebates we study are one-time, some similar government payments are recurring.  For example, residents 
of Alaska get annual payments deriving from the royalties on North Sea oil.  Hsieh (2003) finds evidence that 
households in Alaska smooth these payments, and thus do not alter their spending at the time of receipt.  In contrast, 
the same households display excess sensitivity of spending to income tax refunds.  Hsieh concludes that for 
households to incorporate anticipated income changes into their consumption paths, these income changes must be 
large and transparent.   
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discussion of the effect of the mechanism for the payment.  The Administration’s analysis 
instead rested on the assumption that the spending from the tax cut would be consistent with 
consumers treating it as permanent.
8  Observationally, this has the same implication as the 
mental accounting framework.  
We are agnostic about the behavioral responses to changes in withholding versus rebates.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide direct evidence on this question—one that has importance 
for the design of fiscal policies.  Our survey approach will shed light on how the mechanism for 
distributing fiscal stimulus matters.  It will also provide direct evidence about whether 
households’ awareness of the policy change matters for their behavior.  In the next section, we 
describe the survey methodology. 
 
II.  Survey Methodology 
In this study we analyze the answers to questions in the Thomson Reuters/University of 
Michigan Surveys of Consumers regarding the spending response of households to the fiscal 
stimulus measures in 2008 and 2009 and to hypothetical alternative stimulus measures.
9  We 
fielded a special module in May and July of 2009 in which we asked respondents how the 2009 
policies were affecting their spending, and also how the 2008 rebates had affected their spending.  
We also incorporate evidence obtained from similar surveys in 2008 on the tax rebates to assess 
the validity of the retrospective responses.  We have previously applied this methodology to 
studying similar policy interventions that put extra disposable income in the hands of households 
with the aim of providing a short-run stimulus to economic activity.
10   
In May and July of 2009 we asked households the following: 
 
                                                 
8 In a speech, CEA Chair Christina Romer stated, “In estimating the effects of the recovery package, Jared Bernstein 
and I used tax and spending multipliers from very conventional macroeconomic models. We used simulations based 
on the realistic assumption that monetary policy would remain loose, and on the assumption that people would treat 
the individual tax cut as permanent. This last assumption is justified by the fact that the President ran on a permanent 
middle class tax cut and just included it in his budget.”  The Case for Fiscal Stimulus:  The Likely Effects of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (New York City, February 27, 2009). 
9 The Michigan survey is a nationally representative monthly survey based on about 500 telephone interviews.  
Individuals are selected for the survey using random digit dial sampling and are interviewed twice, six months apart.  
In any month about 60 percent of the respondents are first-time interviewees and about 40 percent are second-time 
interviewees.  The analysis in this paper primarily relies on the repeated cross section of the surveys and draws on 
the short panel for a few sensitivity checks.   
10 See Shapiro and Slemrod (1995, 2003a, 2003b, 2009) and Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2010).   
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Under this year’s economic stimulus program, most workers will receive an income tax 
credit. The tax credit will, in most cases, be four hundred dollars to eight hundred dollars 
per household this year and next. The tax credit will reduce the amount of taxes withheld 
from paychecks. As a result, take-home pay may increase as much as sixty-seven dollars 
per month for married workers or forty-four dollars per month for single workers. 
 
Thinking about your (family’s) financial situation this year, will this income tax credit 
lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off 
debt?  
 
The format of this question closely followed the question asked previously in the Surveys of 
Consumers about the response to the 2008 tax rebates, which were distributed as a one-time 
payment.  While our analysis will draw on those previous responses during 2008, we also asked 
the respondents in 2009 retrospectively about their response to the 2008 tax rebates, using the 
following wording: 
Under last year’s economic stimulus program, many households received tax rebates that 
amounted to six hundred dollars for individuals and twelve hundred dollars for married 
couples. Those with dependent children received an additional three hundred dollars per 
child. The tax rebates were paid by check or direct deposit.  Did you (or your family) 
receive a tax rebate last year? 
 
For those households who answered yes, we then asked: 
  
Did last year’s tax rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, 
or mostly to pay off debt? 
 
The 2009 survey also inquired about various aspects of the change in withholding, including 
whether their (or their spouse’s) employer had already lowered the amount of withholding, 
whether they had heard previously about the 2009 tax credit and whether they expected the tax 
credit to be extended.  
 
III.  Results 
A.  Tabular Results 
Table 1 summarizes our main finding. The spending response to the reduced withholding in 2009 
was considerably weaker than the spending response to either the tax rebates in 2008 or the one-
time payments in 2009.  The first row shows, for the alternate policies, the percent of recipients 
who reported that the extra income would mostly lead them to mostly increase spending in the 
next year, which we henceforth refer to as the spend rate.  The first three columns show the  
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survey responses to the 2008 tax rebates from three different sets of surveys.  In May and June 
2008, as the rebates were being received, 19 percent of households said that the tax rebates 
would lead them to mostly increase their spending.  The spend rate rises modestly in 
retrospective reports.  In November and December 2008, about six months after the receipt of the 
rebates, respondents reported a 22 percent spend rate.  In May and July 2009, about a year after 
the receipt of the rebate, the reported spend rate rose to 25 percent of households.
11   
The spend rate from the change in withholding resulting from the 2009 tax credit is 
substantially lower than the spend rate from the 2008 rebate.  The fourth column of Table 1 
shows that just 13 percent of households said that the 2009 lower withholding would lead them 
to mostly increase their spending—roughly half the spend rate for the 2008 tax rebates.
12  The 
weaker spending response to the lower withholding could reflect a change in households’ 
response to stimulus income, regardless of its delivery, between 2008 and 2009, as overall 
economic conditions deteriorated.  But, as the last two columns of Table 1 show, in the same 
survey the hypothetical one-time payment in 2009 and the actual one-time payment to retirees in 
2009 both elicited significantly higher spend rates than the reduced withholding.  Of course, the 
summary statistics in Table 1 may also mask important and relevant differences in the 
demographic makeup of the recipients of the various stimulus policies.
13  In what follows, we 
first present tabulations of the additional survey responses and then turn to multivariate 
econometric analysis and interpretation of the free responses to investigate why the spend rate 
from the Making Work Pay tax credit is relatively low. 
 
Awareness of policy.—most respondents in May and July of 2009 were unaware that the change 
in their withholding had already occurred.  The $44 per month change in withholding for single 
                                                 
11 The increase in the spend rate from May/June 2008 to May/July 2009 is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.  In contrast, the increase in the spend rate from May/June 2008 to Nov/Dec 2008 and the differences in the 
saving and debt repayment rates for the rebates across the surveys are not statistically significant.  Over a long 
enough time horizon, we expect that additional income will be spent, but the effectiveness of the stimulus is largely 
judged by the near-term effects and not the long-run response.   
12 The aggregate spend rate from the lower withholding is significantly less than each of rebate spend rates at the 5 
percent level. 
13 There are minor differences in the question sequences across surveys that we think are unlikely to drive the results. 
These differences arose mainly because the date of the survey affected the most natural way to ask the questions 
about the policies.  For example, respondents in the 2009 surveys are not asked whether they expect to receive the 
2009 tax credit, but they are asked whether they had received the 2008 tax rebate.  The lead-in question about the 
receipt of the tax rebates was not asked in May/June 2008 survey. While a much lower fraction volunteered that they 
would not receive the tax rebate, the distribution of the spend/save/pay debt survey responses was quite similar to 
the Nov/Dec 2008 surveys when the lead-in was asked.    
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and the $67 per month change in withholding for married workers mentioned in the survey 
question reflect the actual changes workers should have seen in their paychecks based on the 
new withholding tables issued by the Internal Revenue Service.
14  The new withholding tables 
were issued effective March 1, 2009, with the changes mandatory as of April 1, 2009.  Even 
though employers were required to adopt the new schedules for payroll tax withholding by April 
1, 2009, Table 2 shows that the majority of respondents surveyed in May and July said “no” or 
“don’t know” to the following question:
  
Has your employer (or your spouse’s employer) already reduced your tax 
withholding and increased your take-home pay?  
While it is possible that some employers had not changed withholding, we believe that most had 
made the required change and that households were simply unaware of the change. There is little 
direct evidence in the NIPAs about the extent to which firms complied with the change in 
withholding.  There is a downward shift in current personal tax payments reported in the monthly 
personal income statistics (see Personal Income and Outlays release, April 2009).  Although the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis adjusted the data to reflect its best estimate of the effect on 
personal tax payments of the change in withholding, it does not use independent data on 
withholding when it makes its monthly estimate of personal income.  The daily Treasury 
statements provide direct, albeit noisy evidence on the actual changes in tax withholding.  The 
Treasury data in the spring of 2009 are broadly consistent with employers adopting the new 
withholding tables as stipulated by the law.  There is no reason to suspect that employer non-
compliance was as high as the household survey responses seem to suggest.  
Perhaps it is not surprising that households were unaware of the change.  There was much 
less publicity for the 2009 change in withholding than for the 2008 stimulus payments.  
Moreover, there were enormous ongoing shocks to the economy and households in early 2009 
that could have easily distracted attention from the change in withholding. Moreover, the 2008 
stimulus payment was the major feature of the 2008 stimulus program, while the 2009 Making 
Work Pay tax credit was one of many components of the 2009 stimulus program.  In 2008, 
households received at least two letters about the stimulus payments, while there was no such 
                                                 
14 Note the asymmetry between the treatment of singles and married workers.  For singles, $44 per month times 9 
months roughly equals the annual value of the tax credit of $400.  For married workers, $67 per month times 9 
months is about $600, less than the $800 value of the tax credit.  Evidently, the IRS was hedging against the 
possibility of underwithholding in the event of two-earner couples.   Under the credit, couples receive a credit of at 
most $800 regardless of whether they have one or two incomes.  
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official notification about the 2009 lower withholding.  Finally, as shown by Jones (2010), 
households display considerable inertia in adjusting tax prepayments in response to changes in 
default withholding, which is consistent with a lack of awareness of such changes. One might 
expect awareness of the withholding change to increase over time, but the percent of respondents 
in July 2009 who report a change in withholding is actually lower than in May 2009, although 
the difference between the two surveys is not statistically significant. 
We can investigate the effect of the awareness of the change in withholding using the 
survey.  Notably, it does not have much effect on the response of households to the additional 
income.  The third column of the top panel of Table 3 compares the spend rates of respondents 
who reported being aware of a change in withholding with the spend rates of those who reported 
no change or not did not know whether their withholding had changed.  (The six percent of 
respondents who volunteer that they are self-employed (see Table 1) are not included in this 
tabulation.)  The spend rate is actually 5 percentage points lower for those individuals who said 
that employer withholding had already changed, although this difference is not statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.  In contrast, the middle panel shows that, 
among the nearly two-thirds of respondents (asked only in July) who had previously heard about 
the 2009 tax credit, the spend rate is 6 percentage points higher, although again the difference is 
not significant.
15  Those respondents who had heard previously about the tax credit are 
significantly more likely to report that their employer had already lowered their withholding.   
The lack of awareness in our survey is also consistent with the reports from the IRS in 
early 2010 that a common mistake in filing for tax year 2009 returns was not claiming the 
Making Work Pay tax credit (which required filling out a new, separate form).
16 The IRS, in its 
usual checking of filed returns, corrected this mistake for eligible households; this correction 
would be reflected in refund payments to the households.  Interestingly this lack of awareness of 
the 2009 tax credit and the mistake on their tax forms may have resulted in an unexpected boost 
to net tax refunds in 2010.  By ignoring the Making Work Pay tax credit in preparing their tax 
returns, these households had calculated that they owed either too large of a tax payment or were 
entitled to too small of a refund.  So the Making Work Pay tax credit may have led to an 
unexpected, one-time payment to households in early 2010.   
                                                 
15 The joint cross tabulations of the first two questions in Table 3 also do not reveal statistically significant 
differences in the spend rates. 
16 See http://abcnews.go.com/Business/feels-tax-refunds-poky/story?id=10110874.    
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The spending responses of households also did not differ by whether the household 
believed that the lower withholding represented a permanent or temporary change in taxes—a 
pattern at odds with the permanent income hypothesis.  While the 2009 Making Work Pay tax 
credit as enacted was to last for only two years, it had been a key feature of the President’s 
campaign and many speculated that it would extend past 2010.  As reported in the bottom panel 
of Table 3, households are fairly evenly split as to whether they thought the tax credit would be 
extended.  However, the mostly-spend rates are nearly identical across the two groups, whereas 
the permanent income hypothesis would have predicted a larger spending response from those 
households who expected an extension.    
 
Economic and demographic factors.—Demographic and economic factors could also help 
explain the differences in the aggregate spend rates.  Table 4 shows how some of these 
characteristics differ among those receiving the 2008 rebate and 2009 change in withholding.
 17  
A comparison of the columns of Table 4 shows that the change in withholding, which only 
affected workers, was targeted at younger and higher-income households relative to the tax 
rebate.  While the households with the lower withholding were slightly more likely than 
recipients of the tax rebate to report being better off financially than a year ago at the time of the 
2009 surveys, a comparable majority of both groups reported being worse off.
18   
Table 5 looks at the distribution of responses to the spend/save/pay debt questions by age 
across the various surveys.  It shows that the spend rates for the tax rebate across the various 
surveys have generally increased with age, although this relationship is not nearly as strong in 
the 2009 surveys.  While the spend rates for the reduced withholding episode are not 
significantly different across the age groups, the oldest households again have the highest 
spending rate.
19   
                                                 
17 To focus on differences in the targeting of the policies rather than the survey samples, this tabulation only 
includes respondents to the May  and July 2009 surveys. In the multivariate analysis where we can control for 
demographics, etc., we pool this sample with the 2008 survey respondents to the rebate. 
18 Early in the overall survey, individuals are asked: “We are interested in how people are getting along financially 
these days. Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse off financially than you 
were a year ago?”  The responses to this question—which is coded as “better now,” “same,” or “worse off”—are an 
input into the construction of the Index of Consumer Sentiment.  The responses are relative to the date of the 
interview and not the date of stimulus receipt. 
19  Note that the under 30 estimates should be approached with caution because of the small number of respondents.  
For example, the 37 percent mostly spend rate for rebates reported in the May/July 2009 interviews has a standard 
error of 9 percentage points.  
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Table 6 reports the distribution of spending response by household income.  There are no 
significant differences in the spend rates across the income groups for either the tax rebates or 
the lower withholding.  These univariate comparisons suggest that the different targeting of the 
stimulus policies is unlikely to explain the differences in the aggregate spend rates, although to 
further investigate this possibility we will include demographic controls in the multivariate 
regression analysis.   
 
Targeting the policies.—One straightforward way to exclude the effects of different recipient 
characteristics is to focus only on the individuals who benefited from both policies.  About 80 
percent of the households who received the tax credit in 2009 also received the tax rebate in 
2008 (“received” here and in the rest of the paper reflects eligibility and thus includes people 
who report no change in their withholding at the time of the survey).  Table 7 summarizes the 
responses for these individuals who were affected by both policies.  A comparison with Table 1, 
which covers all respondents, reveals very small differences in the aggregate spend rates for the 
two stimulus programs.  In particular, the fraction of households who plan to mostly spend the 
additional take-home pay from the lower withholding remains more than 10 percentage points 
below the fraction that mostly spent the rebates.   
The substantial deterioration in macroeconomic conditions after households received 
their 2008 rebates may have made them less apt to spend the additional income from lower 
withholding in 2009 than from the rebates in 2008, as they may have been more inclined to use 
additional disposable income to build up their assets or reduce their debt.  To address this 
possibility, our survey also asks about the stimulus payments of $250 sent to retirees in the 
spring of 2009.  The timing of the retiree payments is similar to the timing of the change in 
withholding, but the delivery of this additional income is similar to the tax rebates. The first 
column of Table 8 provides the responses from all households who received the one-time retiree 
payments in 2009.  About 30 percent of these older households planned to mostly increase their 
spending in response to the retiree payment.  These spend rates are well above the overall spend 
rates for the tax rebates or the change in withholding.  The next two columns of Table 8 are 
restricted to individuals who received both a retiree payment in 2009 and a tax rebate in 2008.  
For those who got both, the spend rates for the retiree payment and rebate are nearly identical.  
Hence, it appears one cannot appeal entirely to changing aggregate conditions to explain why the  
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spend rate from the 2009 change in withholding is lower than from the 2008 rebate.  At least for 
this group of people, the passage of time and changes in the macroeconomy did not affect their 
reported spend rates. 
Of course, comparing the spending response in 2009 of older households who are largely 
not working to the spending response of all people in 2008 may not reliably indicate the effects 
of macroeconomic conditions on the spending response to stimulus payments.  For this reason 
we also asked individuals who did not receive the retiree payment in 2009 to consider what they 
would do if they had received such a one-time payment.  Table 9 provides the responses for 
individuals who answered questions about these hypothetical payments, the change in 
withholding and the tax rebates.  Similar to the results from the actual retiree payments, we find 
that among these households the spending response to the hypothetical payments is similar to the 
response to tax rebates.  Because these three questions were asked in the same survey, these 
results suggest that the weaker spending response to the change in withholding is not simply a 
reflection of the changing economic conditions that occurred between the 2008 and 2009 
stimulus programs.   
  All in all, the tabulated survey results point to the importance of the income delivery 
mechanism for the spending response.  Additional income that is distributed to households as 
lump-sum payments, including the 2008 rebates and the 2009 retiree payments, appears to 
generate higher spend rates than income that is distributed gradually via lower withholding.  The 
next section uses multivariate regressions to separate the effects of various factors on the 
stimulus spend rates.  
 
B.  Regression Analysis: Pooled Across Policies 
In the regression analysis, we examine the spend/save responses to three different recent stimulus 
policies:  the lower withholding, the tax rebates, and the retiree payments.  To do so, we estimate 
a linear probability model that pools the responses to five different questions: (1) the responses 
to the change in withholding in 2009, (2) the contemporaneous responses to the tax rebates in the 
spring of 2008, (3) the retrospective responses to the tax rebates in the winter of 2008 and the 
spring of 2009, (4) the responses to the 2009 retiree payments, and (5) the response of non-
retirees in 2009 to a hypothetical payment.  The dependent variable is set to be 1 if the stimulus 
program led the household to mostly spend, and zero otherwise.  Thus, we combine mostly save  
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and mostly pay off debt into a not-spend category.  The explanatory variables include categorical 
controls for whether the extra income was delivered via lower withholding or a one-time 
payment, whether the survey response was prospective or retrospective, and whether the stimulus 
program considered was hypothetical, as well as the amount of additional annual income that the 
household received from the stimulus program.  The coefficient estimates on the covariates are 
multiplied by 100, so the effects are expressed as percentage points.  In some specifications, we 
also include a variable about changes in the household’s financial condition, the level of the local 
unemployment rate, and a set of demographic explanatory variables (e.g., age and income).  
Table 10 provides summary statistics for the covariates in the sample for the regressions.   
The sample includes responses from over 2,500 individuals in the May and June 2008, 
November and December 2008, and May and July 2009 surveys. Note that some individuals 
provided responses regarding more than one of the following three stimulus programs:  the 2008 
rebate, the 2009 tax credit, and the 2009 retiree payment.  In this section, multiple responses for 
one individual are treated as separate observations, and the standard errors in the regressions are 
corrected for the clustering.  The household-level covariates are measured at the time of survey 
and not necessarily the time of stimulus receipt.  For example, the variable of “current finances 
compared to a year ago,” which is a part of the core Michigan survey, asks households to assess 
conditions at the time of the survey interview (in our case either May/June 2008, Nov/Dec 2008 
or May/July 2009) relative to a year prior to their interview.  Hence, for respondents providing 
retrospective stimulus responses, this variable is not aligned to the stimulus receipt.  We also 
include the state unemployment rate, measured close to the time of the receipt of the stimulus, as 
an additional measure of aggregate economic conditions.  In contrast to the qualitative survey 
responses, we align this measure temporally with the stimulus.
20   
                                                 
20 Richard Curtin, the Director of the Michigan survey, provided us with the telephone area code of respondents.  It 
is difficult to align area code with county or MSA-level unemployment data, so we aggregated to the state level.  
Our survey does not ask households when they received their tax rebate or when employers changed their 
withholding, so we use a common date for each policy. The unemployment rate variable is aligned with the receipt 
of the stimulus—for the 2008 rebates we chose May 2008 and for the 2009 policies we chose May 2009.  The 
results are not sensitive to small changes in the date convention, e.g., changing the date to March or April 2009 for 
the withholding policy.  It is possible that a household moved state between the receipt of the stimulus and their 
interview (which may be up to one year later), so there will be some errors in assigning the state-level measures. The 
difference between the average unemployment rate for the retiree payments and that for the change in withholding 
and hypothetical payments reflects the differing distribution of respondents across states, not differences in timing of 
the policies.   
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Because the 2009 surveys did not ask households directly about the dollar amount they 
had received or expected to receive from these three stimulus measures, in order to study the 
effect of the size of the stimulus on the spending response we used algorithms based on the 
program rules and household total income and demographics to impute the dollar value of each 
stimulus program for each household.
21  In the case of the 2008 tax rebates, we can compare our 
imputed values to the self-reported values in the 2008 surveys. The average imputed amount of 
the tax rebates is 5 percent more than the amounts reported by the households, and the 
correlation between the imputed and self-reported amount is 0.67.
22  We do not expect this 
imputation to be perfect because the survey only includes total household income, so we cannot 
exactly determine the level of eligibility for the stimulus measures.  We impute only one 
payment to households who report receiving the retiree payment because the survey does not 
contain information on number of recipients. 
Another potential source of variation in how individuals perceived one-time payments is 
that some received them via paper check and others via electronic funds transfer.  Our prior 
analysis of the 2008 tax rebates found no significant difference of the spend rates associated with 
this delivery mechanism.
23  Consequently, in our surveys in 2009 we did not ask households how 
they received their 2008 tax rebates or their 2009 retiree payments.  Because we did not ask 
                                                 
21 The 2009 tax credit equals 6.2 percent of earned income with a maximum credit of $400 for singles and $800 for 
married couples.  The credit is phased out at a rate of 2 percent of income for singles with income above $75,000 
and married couples with income above $150,000.  To impute the value of the credit, we use total 2008 household 
income and marital status as reported on the survey.  This will be quite accurate for capturing the phase-out of the 
credit because the phase-out is based on total household income, not earned income.  For those who refused to report 
income (either a level or bracketed amount), we assigned values of $400 for singles and $800 for married couples. 
  The 2008 tax rebate went to all tax filers with more than $3000 in qualifying income (Social Security benefits, 
veterans’ benefits, and Railroad Retirement benefits plus earned income).  (Those with qualifying income who 
ordinarily would not have to file [mainly low-income Social Security recipients] had to file a 2007 return to get the 
rebate.)  The rebate was $600 per adult taxpayer ($300 for those who did not have a tax liability but received the 
rebate owing to having qualifying income) plus $300 per dependent child under the age of 18. The imputation for 
the 2008 tax rebate assumes that singles under age 65 receive $600 plus $300 for each child under age 18, and that 
married couples receive $1200 plus the same child benefit.  The 2008 tax rebate is phased out at a rate of 5 percent 
of income for singles with income above $75,000 and married couples with income above $150,000.  For both the 
actual and hypothetical retiree payment in 2009, we assume that households received $250. 
22 According to our imputation, about 4 percent of the 2008 rebate recipients and 8.5 percent of the recipients of the 
2009 Making Work Pay tax credit should not have received the stimulus payment or reduction in withholding, 
respectively.  This could reflect errors in our imputation procedure.  These individuals are not significantly different, 
however, than the rest of the recipients in their awareness of the stimulus programs or in their propensity to spend 
the extra income. 
23 The mostly-spend rate of those who received their 2008 rebates via a paper check in the mail was 21 percent, 
compared to 22 percent for those who received it via electronic direct deposit; the difference between the two rates 
is economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  See Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2010), Table 8.  
Parker et al (2011) also find no evidence of differences in spending responses to the 2008 tax rebates across 
households who received direct deposit versus paper checks.  
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about EFT versus paper check in the 2009 surveys, we do not include a control for the form of 
disbursement in the regressions.  
 
Effects of delivery mechanism, timing of survey response, and size of payment.—Table 11 reports 
estimates of the linear probability model (coefficients multiplied by 100 so their interpretation is 
the percentage point response of the mostly spend rate).
24  The regression results are broadly 
consistent with the patterns revealed in the tabulations in the previous section.  The fraction of 
people who report that a stimulus payment leads them to mostly spend is highest in response to a 
small, lump-sum payment.  In the specification in the first column of Table 11, which does not 
control for macroeconomic conditions or demographics and includes responses to all three 
stimulus measures, the use of lower withholding to deliver stimulus income is associated with a 
10.9 percentage point reduction in the mostly-spend rates compared to a one-time payment.  
Thus, the use of a change in withholding rather than rebate for the 2009 tax credit can account 
for more than three-fourths of the lower mostly-spend rate of the 2009 tax credit relative to the 
2008 tax rebates reported in Table 1. This effect of the delivery mechanism is highly statistically 
significant.   
Of course, the 2008 rebates and the 2009 change in withholding occurred under different 
macroeconomic conditions, corresponded to different underlying policies, were of different size, 
and affected the income of households in different proportions.  The purpose of the multivariate 
regression analysis is to simultaneously control for these factors and then determine which 
factors are quantitatively most important in accounting for the lower mostly-spend rates from the 
2009 tax credit relative to the 2008 tax rebate. The regressions reported in Table 11 include 
various combinations of the covariates summarized in Table 10 to account for these factors. 
Table 11, specification (1), includes controls for timing of receipt of the 2008 rebate, for 
stimulus as a fraction of income, and for whether the stimulus payment is hypothetical.  The 
point estimate of the reporting the spending rate 12 months after the receipt of the rebate is 2.7 
percent (not statistically significant) in contrast to the 6 percentage point unconditional effect 
reported in Table 1.   
Specification (1) also shows a negative association between the amount of the extra 
income from the stimulus program and the spend rates of that stimulus.  Specifically, a 1 
                                                 
24 A probit analysis yields very similar estimates.  
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percentage point increase in the size of the stimulus income relative to the household’s annual 
income is associated with a spend rate that is roughly 1 percentage point lower.  Because, on 
average, the 2008 tax rebate is about 1.3 percentage  points larger, as a percent of annual income, 
than the 2009 tax credit (see table 10), the estimated size effect, on its own, would suggest a 
larger spending response to the 2009 tax credit than the 2008 rebates (which is at odds with the 
pattern in Table 1).   
Finally, whether households are asked about an actual or hypothetical policy appears to 
have little effect on the reported spending response.
25  This finding suggests that the survey 
response to hypothetical rebates is not systematically different from that of actual rebates, so that 
we can use the hypothetical rebates as a contemporaneous control for spending behavior from 
changes in withholding.  
 
Effect of macroeconomic conditions.—Specification (2) of Table 11 adds two measures of 
changes in household finances—whether households reported being worse off financially at the 
time of their interview relative to a year prior, and their expected income growth over the next 
year—and labor market conditions at the time of the stimulus receipt.  These variables have both 
time-series and cross-sectional variation.  The cross-sectional variation is critical for identifying 
whether macroeconomic conditions affected the response to the policy.  There is no identifying 
information at the aggregate level to distinguish whether the differences in spending responses 
between 2008 and 2009 are due to variations in policy design or from changes in macroeconomic 
conditions. 
  Households who report being worse off financially are almost 7 percentage points less 
likely to report mostly spending the additional income from any given policy.  Households 
interviewed in 2009 as they were receiving the 2009 tax credit were, however, only 1/2 
percentage point more likely to report a decline in their finances than households interviewed in 
the spring of 2008 as they were receiving the 2008 tax rebate.
26  Hence, this small aggregate 
change in self-reported financial conditions applied to the regression coefficient reported in 
                                                 
25 In a 2002 survey, Shapiro and Slemrod (2003b) found a lower mostly spend rate from a hypothetical one-time 
payment of $1,000 than the actual 2001 tax rebates (of either $300 or $600).  This difference could reflect the 
hypothetical nature of the former payment, the relative size of the payments, or the fact that the hypothetical 
payment was temporary and the rebates were part of a permanent change in taxes.  
26 Over this period there was a larger decline in the percent of these households reporting an improvement in their 
finances over the past year, from 27 percent in the spring of 2008 to 24 percent in the spring of 2009.      
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Table 11 implies a trivial reduction in the aggregate mostly-spend rates from the 2008 tax rebates 
and the 2009 tax credits.   
Households who expect their income to decline over the next year are less likely to spend 
the additional income from stimulus programs.  For example, a household that expected their 
income to decline by more than 10 percent over the next year has a mostly-spend rate almost 8 
percentage points lower than a household that expects their income to be unchanged.  The 
fraction of stimulus recipients who expect large income declines increased from 2008 to 2009 by 
about 4½ percentage points, so the expected income growth measure shows more substantial 
adverse changes than the “worse off financially measure.”  Nonetheless, the 4½   percentage 
point increase in those reporting at least a 10 percent decline in income still has only a modest 
effect on the aggregate spend rate (-7.8 x 0.045 moves the average predicted spend rate by less 
than ½ percentage point).  Hence, although we are able to estimate a substantial effect of 
changing individual economic condition on spending using cross-sectional variation in 
households’ self-reported conditions, there is relatively little implied effect on the aggregate 
spend rate from the change in these measures of economic conditions.   
As an additional control for macroeconomic conditions, we include the state 
unemployment rate at the time of the initial receipt of the stimulus payment (May 2008 for 2008 
rebate and May 2009 for the 2009 change in withholding and rebates).  The point estimate is not 
statistically significant and changes sign across specifications, so the coefficient on the state 
unemployment rate does not provide any additional support for the finding that worse economic 
conditions are usually associated with lower spending from the stimulus payments.  All in all, 
these estimates suggest that the switch from a one-time payment to a change in withholding was 
a more important factor than the worsening of economic conditions over the period for 
explaining the aggregate patterns in the mostly-spend rates across the two policies. 
Note that the finding that spending is lower for those whose personal economic 
circumstances have deteriorated and whose income is expected to fall has implications for both 
the design of policy and for how we understand economic behavior.  Under the permanent 
income hypothesis, a liquidity-constrained household will spend a greater fraction of an 
increment to cash flow than an unconstrained household provided that the constrained household 
has temporarily low income.  Our finding that those households who are currently worse off than 
the previous year have a lower spend rate is hard to explain with liquidity constraints, unless  
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those households are expecting even worse economic circumstances in the future.  Indeed, our 
findings run against the conventional wisdom that households in worse economic conditions are 
more likely to spend a stimulus payment.   
The results for expected income growth are, however, more broadly consistent with the 
permanent income hypothesis.  We find that expecting low income growth over the next year 
predicts mostly saving the stimulus payment.  Hence, at least under the circumstances of 2008 
and 2009, it proved difficult to jump-start the economy by providing cash to those whose 
economic circumstances had declined or were worsening, because households did not expect the 
negative shocks to their personal finances to quickly reverse. 
 
Effects of household demographics and targeting of the stimulus policies.—The three stimulus 
policies that we consider targeted at different types of households, so the specification (3) of 
Table 11 incorporates a number of demographic controls.  Adding demographic explanatory 
variables to the regression modestly reduces the point estimate of the effect of the delivery 
mechanism, but does not change the basic patterns across the attributes of the stimulus programs 
and changes in economic conditions.  The coefficients of the demographic controls in the 
multivariate analysis support the findings in the tabulations.  Older households are more likely to 
spend the stimulus payments.  There is little relation between income and wealth and spending, 
except that the highest wealth households (measured by wealth held in stock) are more likely to 
spend the payments.  
The demographic controls in our study are not exhaustive, so we restrict the estimates to 
the variation within the policies to the extent possible.   In specification (4), we use the same 
specification (3), but we use only the observations from the 2009 tax credit and the 2009 retiree 
payments (actual and hypothetical).  Because these policies were contemporaneous, this 
specification abstracts from aggregate changes in the policy and macroeconomic environment.  
The coefficient estimates on better off or worse off financially, expected income growth, and 
state unemployment are identified only from variation across different households.  Excluding 
the observations on the 2008 tax rebates substantially reduces the sample and makes the 
estimates less precise.  In terms of the point estimates, the effects of both the change in 
withholding delivery mechanism and the change in economic conditions become somewhat  
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larger in absolute value.  The effect of the form of payment remains large and statistically 
significant.  
In specification (5), we instead exclude the retiree payments (actual and hypothetical) and 
focus only on the 2008 tax rebates versus the 2009 tax credits.  Again, the sample restrictions 
reduce the precision of the estimates.  With this sample, the estimated negative effect delivering 
the stimulus via the change in withholding is noticeably smaller in absolute value than in the 
other specifications.  It is not statistically significantly different from either zero, or the 9 to 12 
percentage point effects found in specifications (1), (2), and (3).   
In summary, the use of a change in withholding to deliver stimulus income appears to 
substantially reduce the spending response of households.  In addition, the worsening of a 
household’s financial situation leads to a reduction in their propensity to mostly spend the 
stimulus.  
 
C.  Qualitative Analysis of Free-Response Answers to Why Stimulus Response Changed 
 
An alternate approach to understand why the mostly-spend rates are lower from the change in 
withholding than from the rebates or the retiree payments is to simply ask households.  To do so, 
we focus on the households who reported mostly spending the rebate or retiree payment but 
reported mostly saving (or paying off debt) the additional income from lower withholding; this 
direction of change in response dominates the aggregate results.  While the sample sizes for this 
analysis are considerably smaller and the interpretation of individuals’ reasons for changing their 
response is inevitably more subjective, these free responses largely confirm our conclusions 
based on the tabulations and regressions.   
The free-response question was posed to two groups of individuals.  As the first column 
of Table 12 shows, 471 individuals received both a 2008 tax rebate and a 2009 tax credit in the 
form of lower withholding.  Nearly 70 percent of these individuals report the same planned use 
of the additional income from both stimulus programs.  The 14 percent who report mostly 
spending the 2008 rebate, but mostly saving or paying down debt in response to the 2009 lower 
withholding, are most useful for understanding the lower aggregate mostly-spend rate for the 
change in withholding.  To these individuals we asked the following question: 
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You said that you mostly spent last year’s tax rebate and that you plan to mostly 
(save/pay off debt with) this year’s tax credit. Why do you plan to use this year’s 
credit differently than last year’s rebate? 
 
The distribution of responses to this question is reported in the first column of Table 13. The first 
column of Table 13 refers to the 64 individuals who said they mostly spent the 2008 tax rebate 
but planned to mostly save or pay off debt with the 2009 tax credit (corresponding to the rounded 
14 percent of respondents in the first row and first column of Table 12).  The most common 
reason (47 percent) given for this difference in behavior is a worsening of general economic or 
personal financial conditions.  A sizeable minority (23 percent) mention the difference in how 
the income is delivered, for example gradual versus lump sum.  Only a small fraction (3 percent) 
points to differences in the size of the stimulus.  A non-trivial number of respondents (19 
percent) simply describe some purchase in 2008 that they needed, or wanted to make that did not 
recur in 2009.  Only 8 percent of the households could not formulate a coherent reason for why 
their behavior differed between the 2009 tax credit and the 2008 tax rebate.  Although these free 
responses suggest a more prominent role for the changing economic conditions than the pooled 
regressions do, the delivery mechanism is an important factor in the weaker spending response.   
  The second column of Table 13 reports result from households who reported that they 
would mostly spend the hypothetical retiree payment in 2009, but would not spend the 2009 tax 
credit.  This free-response question was only asked in the July 2009 survey, so the sample size is 
about half as large as in the first column.  Not surprisingly, no one pointed to a change in 
economic or personal financial conditions to justify the difference in behavior, because the two 
stimulus measures are described as happening at the same time.  The most common response (36 
percent) is a difference in the delivery mechanism—lump sum versus a change in withholding.  
The free responses included comments such as it is “hard to notice” the extra money from the 
2009 tax credit and that it is different having an extra $250 in your pocket than having an extra 
$20 in each paycheck, and that extra money in a paycheck goes toward paying debts rather than 
additional spending.  Another large fraction of households (33 percent) points to the fact that the 
retiree payment was smaller than the tax credit and they are more inclined to mostly spend the 
smaller amount; this is consistent with the tabulated results.  In this case, households are clearly 
focusing on the annual stimulus or total stimulus from the two programs, as on a monthly basis 
the tax credit is a smaller boost to income.    
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It is possible that, because the boost to paychecks from the 2009 tax credits was too small 
for many households to perceive (consistent with Table 2), the boost to spending was too small 
to perceive and therefore mention in response to this survey question.  As in the comparisons 
between the 2008 tax rebate and the 2009 tax credit, a minority (12 percent) points to some 
particular expense for which they would use the hypothetical retiree payment.  Unlike in the first 
column, there were a substantial number of responses (15 percent) in which households justify 
the different behavior as a “spend some, save some” philosophy.  It is possible that this split-the-
difference attitude reflects the hypothetical nature of the question, but it could also point to the 
fact that, even for a given household, the spending and saving heuristics are not always 
unambiguous.  In this category are also individuals who said they would spend the retiree 
payment because it was unexpected or “bonus money.”  As with the 2008 tax rebate sample 
shown in the first column of the table, only a small fraction (3 percent, that is, just one of 33 
respondents) could not provide a reason for their difference in spending behavior across the two 
programs. 
 
IV.  Relationship with Other Research 
Of course, research estimating the spending response to tax cuts has a long history, and the 
survey methodology described heretofore is just one of many research designs.  Some earlier 
studies used a similar survey-based methodology to estimate the spending response to policy 
initiatives designed to stimulate the economy.  Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) examined the 2001 
stimulus program that sent out rebate checks of $300 or $600 to most households, and found that 
22 percent responded that the receipt of the payments would lead them to mostly spend more, in 
spite of the fact that these payments were part of a ten-year tax cut where the cut was generally 
higher in later years.  Wealth holding was a strong cross-sectional predictor of the spending 
propensity but, contrary to received wisdom at the time, low income was not. 
Coronado, Lupton, and Sheiner (2005) used a similar survey methodology, analyzing 
questions added to the August, September, and October 2003 Survey of Consumers regarding the 
behavioral response to the Jobs and Growth Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA), enacted in 
2003.  JGTRRA had two tax cut components relevant to this paper’s interest, one delivered via a 
one-time payment and the other via reduced employer withholding, making it a natural place to 
evaluate the relative effectiveness of these alternative distribution mechanisms.    First, it reduced  
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most marginal tax rates above 15 percent by two percentage points, and reduced the top marginal 
tax rate by 3.6 percentage points; these rate cuts were implemented by changes in employer 
withholding that began on July 1, 2003.  Second, it increased the child tax credit from $600 per 
child to $1000 per child for 2003 and 2004.  The 2003 portion of the increase ($400) per child 
was sent as an “advance rebate check” to those who had claimed child tax credits on their 2002 
tax returns.   They found that, overall, 24.0 percent of those who reported receiving the child tax 
credit rebate said they mostly spent it, a slightly higher spend rate than the  20.7 percent saying 
that they mostly spent the increase in take-home pay resulting from the reduction in employer 
withholding.  Among the 306 households that reported receiving both a child credit rebate and 
reduced withholding, the mostly spend percentages were much closer: 21.4 percent for the child 
credit rebate and 20.6 percent for the reduced withholding tax. 
Three recent studies have used the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) conducted by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics to examine the spending response to tax rebates.  Johnson, Parker, 
and Souleles (2006) measure the change in expenditure caused by the receipt of the 2001 rebate 
using a special module of questions in 2001 asked households whether they received any rebate 
checks, how many rebate checks they received, and the amount of each check received. Their 
research design exploits the random timing of rebate payments over a 10-week period as well as 
the cross-sectional variation in the rebates. 
They find that the responses of total expenditures, including durable expenditures such as 
auto and truck purchases, did not respond to the timing of the payment to a statistically 
significant extent.  When, however, expenditures are restricted to exclude durable purchases, 
they do find a significant effect.
27  Their results suggest that, during the three-month period in 
which the rebate was received, expenditures on non-durable goods, broadly defined, increased by 
37 percent of the rebate check amount.  For the second and third three-month periods after the 
receipt of the check, the point estimate of the spending responses is positive, but in neither case 
is the estimate significantly different from zero.  All in all, the response of nondurable (but not 
total) expenditures in the first quarter after the receipt of the checks is broadly consistent with 
                                                 
27 Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006, footnote 27) “found no significant evidence of response in durables such as 
automobiles or large household equipment like furniture and televisions, which again might reflect the relatively 
small size of the average refund per household and the greater volatility of expenditure on such durables.”  
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what the survey responses suggest—an MPC of about one-third.
28  What differs is the suggestion 
that a consumption response persisted into the second, and even third, quarter after the receipt of 
the checks.  The point estimates of the cumulative effect therefore suggest a much larger total, 
but not immediate, response, but the precision of the estimates that linger after the first quarter is 
not very high.  The point estimates of the impact effects are quite close to those found in our 
research. 
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2009) find a somewhat more modest spending response to 
the child tax credits in 2003 than to the tax rebates in 2001.  They estimate that about one quarter 
of the child tax credit was spent on nondurables in the three month period of receipt.  The 
spending effect in the second three months is smaller and imprecisely measured.  As in 2001, 
there is no evidence of spending response for durables.  In 2003, the variation in the timing of 
receipt is too limited to provide identification for this one-time payment and the comparison to 
non-recipient households may be complicated by the reduction in withholding that occurred at 
the same time. 
Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2011), henceforth PSJM, use a similar 
module of questions appended to the CES to address the spending response to the 2008 
economic stimulus payments.  PSJM find that non-durable expenditure rose between 12 and 30 
percent of the payment in the first three months after receipt of the payment, smaller than the 
point estimates of JPS but within the range of confidence.  In striking contrast to JPS (2006), 
though, they find that the rebates caused a significant increase in spending on durable goods—in 
particular, on vehicles—of nearly 40 percent of the rebate payment, bringing the induced total 
expenditure to between 50 and 90 percent of the payments.  Table 14 shows that the estimated 
fraction of the rebates spent on new motor vehicles in PSJM would imply that the rebates 
generated about one-third of the aggregate outlays on motor vehicles in the second and third 
quarters of 2008, which seems surprisingly high particularly given that there were no dramatic 
                                                 
28 Translating the percentage of people responding that they would “mostly spend” additional disposable income 
into an aggregate MPC requires making assumptions about the range and distribution of individual MPCs that 
correspond to each possible survey answer, and then aggregating them.  Shapiro and Slemrod (2003b) develop one 
such set of assumptions, based on a bound between zero and one for individual MPCs, that maps a 22 percent 
“mostly spend” rate into an aggregate MPC of about 33 percent.  Coronado et al (2005) develop another procedure 
for making this mapping.  Note, though, that both methods presume that the individual MPCs lie between zero and 
one.    
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shifts in motor vehicle outlays around the rebate period.
29   Yet it does raise an interesting point 
that an individual’s MPC out of stimulus could be well above one.  We assume individual MPCs 
at or below one when we translate mostly-spend rates to a MPC.
30   
As in our earlier research, PSJM find no significant difference in the spending response 
depending on the method of disbursement—mailed checks versus electronic funds transfer—
holding constant demographic differences between the those who choose a given disbursement 
method.   
The outlier among the studies that use this pair of methodologies is the Shapiro and 
Slemrod (1995) survey-based analysis of the 1992 change in withholding designed to stimulate a 
weak economy.  This policy is different from the other post-2000 tax cuts implemented via 
changes in employer withholding because it was explicitly not a tax cut at all, but rather a 
reduction in withholding remittances that would be exactly (other than interest) offset by either a 
reduced refund or an increased balance due come tax filing time in the spring of 1993.  
Economic theory suggests that this kind of policy would have the least impact on spending, as it 
does not require a far-sighted Ricardian to see that after-tax income has not been increased at all.  
But a special module of questions in the April, 1992 Survey of Consumers revealed that 43 
percent said they would mostly spend the reduction in withholding, a substantially higher 
fraction than offered this response in 2001, 2003, 2008, or 2009.  It is true that the question 
wording differed from that used in the later surveys,
31 but there is no obvious reason why the 
different wording would substantially increase the frequency of “mostly spend” or “spend most 
of it” responses.  Hence, it appears that the behavioral response to the 1992 change in 
withholding was, for some reason, qualitatively different from the response to the subsequent 
policy changes discussed here. 
                                                 
29 The estimated effect of stimulus payments on new vehicle purchases, although statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 10 percent level, has a sizeable standard error.  The 90% confidence interval for this nominal share 
(using only the standard error on the PSJM point estimate) ranges from near 0 to almost two-thirds.     
30 In correspondence about Table 14, Jonathan Parker added two further caveats: First, the estimates on the 
individual components of spending, including new vehicles, are noisier than the estimates from broader aggregates.  
While the implied spending on new vehicles might be implausibly high, for other expenditure components it might 
seem surprisingly weak.  Nonetheless, PSJM highlight the importance of vehicle spending for the overall stimulus 
response.  Second, one should be cautious in drawing too many inferences from this type of counterfactual exercise.  
In the absence of the rebates, outlays on motor vehicles might have fallen more sharply during the middle of 2008.  
Such a sharp drop in sales might have induced automakers and dealers to reduce prices and thereby boost demand.   
31 “How do you think you will use the extra $25 per month—do you think you will spend most of it, save most of it, 
use most of it to repay debts, or what?”  
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Because the CES added a Shapiro-Slemrod style question to the 2008 module, it can 
corroborate the information content of the Survey of Consumers answers.  PSJM conclude that, 
compared to those who say they’ll mostly save the lump-sum payment; those who say they’ll 
“mostly spend” spent 35 cents more per dollar on non-durables, and 75 cents more overall.  Thus, 
the CES-based studies corroborate that survey responses are strongly associated with actual 
incremental spending as they measure it, but differ on the level of induced spending across all 
consumers’ self-classifications.   
However, on the focus of this paper—the effect of alternative delivery mechanisms on 
the propensity to spend-- there is less of a consensus.  No recent study, until the present one, has 
found that the delivery mechanism has a significant effect on the propensity to spend.  Coronado 
et al conclude that the spending out of a change in withholding was essentially the same as the 
response to a lump-sum payment.  In contrast, Souleles (2002) finds high spend rates (up to 90 
percent) from reductions in withholding due to the Reagan tax cuts in the 1980s; however, 
behavioral responses may have changed since then and many of the results are estimated with 
little precision.  PSJM and also Sahm, Shapiro, Slemrod (2009) find no difference in the 
spending response of a lump-sum payment delivered by check versus electronic funds transfer.  
In contrast to earlier results, in this paper we find that reductions in withholding induce less 
spending than a lump-sum payment.  To date, no study has found real-world evidence consistent 
with some behavioral theories that reductions in withholding induce more spending than 
alternative delivery mechanisms.  This result may be biased if the two delivery mechanisms not 
only differentially affect spending propensities, but also differentially affect the ability of survey 
respondents to accurately gauge how the payment in fact affected their behavior relative to the 
counterfactual of no payment.  Future research might usefully address this open question.  
  
V.  Conclusion 
The mostly-spend rate from the 2009 tax credit, which was delivered as a change in withholding, 
was less than the mostly-spend rate from the 2008 tax rebates, which was delivered as a one-time 
payment.  This research attempts to isolate the effect of delivery mechanism by comparing the 
same individuals’ responses to alternative policies, so it provides specific evidence on the 
relevance of the delivery mechanism for behavioral responses. Univariate tabulations, 
multivariate regressions, and analysis of free responses about the reason for a changed response  
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for the various stimulus measures all suggest a primary role for the way in which the stimulus 
income is delivered to households in determining spending.  Changes in economic and personal 
financial conditions play a secondary, but also important, role in the spending response of 
households to the fiscal stimulus.   
As discussed in Section I, the mental accounts hypothesis of Thaler suggests that a 
change in withholding should lead to more spending than a rebate.  Under this formulation of 
mental accounts, a sizeable rebate is added to the asset account while a change in withholding is 
treated as an ongoing flow of income.  Only a small fraction of additions to assets accounts is 
spent while a high fraction of ongoing flows of income is spent. Our finding does not provide 
support for the mental accounts hypothesis’s prediction about the difference in behavior between 
rebates and changes in withholding.   
The low propensity to consume from the 2009 change in withholding is indeed a puzzle 
from many perspectives.  As discussed above, the Administration expected the change in 
withholding to be added to households’ estimate of their permanent income, which would lead to 
the same prediction of a high spending rate as the mental accounts hypothesis.  Spending from 
the change in withholding, however, is not a function of whether households expected the 
underlying tax credit to be extended. 
The salience or simply the visibility of the rebate versus a change in withholding could 
also affect behavior.  Our approach provides some evidence of the behavioral response as a 
function of visibility.  We find that the majority of households did not notice the withholding 
changes associated with the 2009 Making Work Pay tax credit.  What does this inattention to 
changes in the bottom line of individuals’ paychecks imply for the spending response?  It is not 
clear what to expect a priori:  will an inattentive household spend extra cash that appears in a 
paycheck, or allow it to accrue in a checking account?  That would depend on whether the 
consumption “autopilot” defaults to spending or saving extra cash.  The survey respondents who 
noticed the change in withholding were no more or less likely to spend the extra disposable 
income.  In their study of the 2001 stimulus payment, which was delivered as a direct payment, 
Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a) find that whether or not a household claims to have a budget is not 
a significant determinant of the spending response but, conditional on having a budget, those 
whose budget targets spending have a somewhat higher propensity to spend relative to other 
budget rules.  As Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a) note, if taken at face value this result implies that  
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households abandon their budget rule at the margin.  Apparently, some households viewed the 
2008 tax rebates as large enough boosts in their income to induce them to make a large purchase 
such as a vacation or a car repair.  In contrast, households receive the 2009 tax credit as a small 
but repeated boost to their paychecks, so it may be less likely to trigger a large purchase; 
alternatively, it may be harder for people to remember and report the extra small expenditures 
that the tax credit induced. Sahm et al (2010), in their analysis of surveys in November and 
December 2008, provide some evidence that households do report making additional smaller 
expenditures in response to stimulus.  Roughly half of the rebate recipients said that they spent 
their 2008 tax rebates on “regular” expenses, and big-ticket durables only comprised one-quarter 
of rebate-induced spending. 
Our survey also provides narrative evidence on why the spending response of individuals 
changed when faced with different mechanisms for delivering payments.  In these free responses, 
some respondents say that the change in the withholding was too small to bother with and 
therefore they saved it.  Note these respondents are telling us something different from the 
conventional wisdom that unnoticed cash gets spent.  In general, near-rational, rule-of-thumb 
behavior can yield either spending or saving unnoticed cash depending on whether the rule of 
thumb targets spending or accumulation.  Hence, our survey provides some direct evidence that 
inattention did not affect behavior in this context. 
One final concern is that the survey answers used in our analysis do not provide an 
accurate signal of the actual spending response of households.  The external validity and 
interpretation of such direct survey responses on the uses of stimulus income has been a long-
standing question with this research approach.  On this point we note first that the research 
reported in this paper is primarily focused on the difference in the mostly-spend rates across 
stimulus programs, and not on the level of the spend rate itself.  Even if levels are biased, 
differences (that is, between the response to direct payments versus withholding) may not be.  
Second, earlier work on the 2001 and 2008 tax rebates (Shapiro and Slemrod 2003b, 2009 and 
Sahm et al. 2010) finds that the survey responses are consistent with aggregate time-series data 
on spending, saving, and consumer debt.  Third, support for the external validity of this approach 
is provided by recent work by Parker et al. (2011) using the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CES) and by Parker and Broda (2009) using Homescan survey scanner data.  Both studies 
include a “mostly spend/save/pay debt” survey question patterned after those developed in the  
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line of research pursued in this paper. Households who responded that they had mostly spent the 
2008 rebate had substantially higher propensities to increase spending due to the rebate as 
measured by their analysis of both the CES and Homescan data, compared to households 
reporting that they had mostly saved or mostly paid off debt. 
All in all, none of the policies implemented in 2008 and 2009 to increase disposable 
income was very effective on a per-dollar basis in stimulating spending in the near term.  
Moreover, in contrast to a prominent behavioral hypothesis, the reduction in withholding led to 
an even lower rate of spending than did one-time payments.  Just 13 percent of households said 
that the 2009 tax credit would lead them to mostly increase their spending—roughly half of the 
mostly-spend rate of 25 percent for the 2008 tax rebates.  Cross-tabulations with additional 
survey questions, regression analysis, and qualitative analysis of the free-response questions all 
confirm a smaller stimulative effect from a change in withholding compared to a one-time 
payment.  Household economic conditions and other features of the stimulus program, such as its 
magnitude relative to total household income, also play a role in the spend/save decision, and 
therefore in the effectiveness of the fiscal stimulus, but their effect is smaller than the effect of 
the delivery mechanism.  Therefore, the survey methods in this paper shed light both on the 
effectiveness of particular stimulus policies and more generally on the design of the mechanisms 
for delivering fiscal stimulus. 
The macroeconomic conditions matter for explaining the spending from the stimulus 
income.  Households who reported that their financial condition had recently deteriorated are less 
likely to spend the stimulus income.  Also, a common explanation in the free responses for 
spending the 2008 stimulus payment while saving the 2009 change in withholding was 
worsening economic circumstances.  This finding runs counter to the conventional wisdom that 
the MPC is higher when household economic conditions are worse.  We do find that spending is 
higher when total household income is expected to improve.  Moreover, the finding that the 
delivery form matters survives controlling for cross-sectional variation in macroeconomic 
conditions facing households.  Because the 2008 rebate policy and the 2009 change in 
withholding were implemented in very different macroeconomic contexts, a concern is that the 
different spending rates across policies simply arose from difference in the conditions when they 
were implemented.  To the extent that cross-sectional variation in macroeconomic conditions is  
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an adequate control, we can show that this legitimate concern does not reverse the finding that 
the delivery mechanism of stimulus income matters. 
Of course, all these considerations also apply to econometric estimates of the marginal 
propensity to consume based on expenditure data.  A case in point of how the response to 
policies differs across time in expenditure data is apparent on estimates based on the CES.  
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) find that the response of durable consumption to the 2001 
rebate was so hard to detect that they did not include results in their published paper.  Parker et al 
(2011) find that the response of durable consumption, especially automobiles, to the 2008 
stimulus payment swamps the response of nondurable consumption.  The juxtaposition of these 
estimates provides a salient example of how the MPC in response to a particular policy may not 
be a structurally invariant parameter. 
The survey approach measures the propensity to consume at a particular point in time in 
response to a particular policy.  It is important to understand that it does not aim to estimate a 
structurally invariant parameter.  There are good reasons why the propensity to consume might 
vary over time.  First, stimulus policies differ over time.  In some cases the payments are 
explicitly one-time, in other cases they relate to persistent changes in taxes.  Second, stimulus 
policies are introduced under very different economic conditions.  The fraction of consumers 
who are liquidity constrained or who are trying to rebuild their balance sheets may be different.  
Third, stimulus payments are distributed by different mechanisms that can affect how they are 
perceived and spent.  Fourth, stimulus polices target different groups that have different 
propensities to consume.  For example, it is likely that a higher fraction of payments going to 
older households will be spent.   
Because the survey approach yields timely estimates of the propensity to consume 
stimulus income, it provides direct evidence on the effectiveness of recent policies.  Moreover, 
the statistical analysis such as carried out in this paper can provide insight into why the effects of 
policies differ over time by examining how economic conditions, household demographics, and 
the mechanisms of delivery of the payments affect the response to the stimulus payments. This 
paper is part of a line of research that examines the response to policies across time using a 
consistent survey questions.  By pooling across different policies, it provides evidence about how 
the details of how the policies were implemented and how the macroeconomic conditions affect 
the response to the policies.  
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Appendix:  Survey Instrument in May 2009 and July 2009 
 
A30.  Now we would like to ask you a few questions about recent tax changes. Under this 
year’s economic stimulus program, most workers will receive an income tax credit. The 
tax credit will, in most cases, be four hundred dollars to eight hundred dollars per 
household this year and next. The tax credit will reduce the amount of taxes withheld 
from paychecks. As a result, take-home pay may increase as much as sixty-seven dollars 
per month for married workers or forty-four dollars per month for single workers.  
Thinking about your (family’s) financial situation this year, will this income tax credit 
lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off 
debt? 
 
A31.  Has your employer (or your spouse’s employer) already reduced your tax withholding 
and increased your take-home pay? 
 
Only asked in the July 2009 survey 
A31a.  Had you heard any information about this tax credit before taking part in this survey? 
 
Only asked in the July 2009 survey 
A31b.  The current tax credit applies to this year and next year. Do you think it will be extended 
into future years? 
 
A32.   Under last year’s economic stimulus program, many households received tax rebates that 
amounted to six hundred dollars for individuals and twelve hundred dollars for married 
couples. Those with dependent children received an additional three hundred dollars per 
child. The tax rebates were paid by check or direct deposit.  Did you (or your family) 
receive a tax rebate last year?  
 
A33.   (Did/Will) last year’s tax rebate lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase 
saving, or mostly to pay off debt?  
 
If answers to A30 and A33 are not the same, go to A35, otherwise go to A36 
A35.   You said that you mostly (spent/saved/paid off debt with) last year’s tax rebate and that 
you plan to mostly (spend/save/pay off debt with) this year’s tax credit. Why do you plan 
to use this year’s credit differently than last year’s rebate?  
 
A36.   Under another provision of this year’s stimulus program, people who are receiving 
income from Social Security, Railroad Retirement, or the Veterans Administration will 
receive a one-time stimulus payment of two hundred fifty dollars this spring.  
 
A36.   Under another provision of this year’s stimulus program, people who are receiving 
income from Social Security, Railroad Retirement, or the Veterans Administration will 
receive a one-time stimulus payment of two hundred fifty dollars this spring.  Have you 




Asked only in the May 2009 survey 
A37.   Do you (or your spouse) expect to receive this one-time payment?   
 
A38.   Will this one-time payment of two hundred fifty dollars lead you mostly to increase 
spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt?  
 
A39.   Suppose that the program rules changed and you did receive this one-time payment of 
two hundred fifty dollars. Would it lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to 
increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt?  
 
Asked only in the July 2009 survey 
If answers to A30 and A39 are not the same, go to A41, otherwise end section 
A41.   You said that you would mostly (spend/save/pay off debt with) this one-time payment 
and that you plan to mostly (spend/save/pay off debt with) this year’s tax credit. Why 
would you use this one-time payment differently than this year’s credit? 
 
Questions about Personal Finances and Income Expectations 
 
A2.   We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say 
  that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse off financially than you 
  were a year ago? 
 
A15.   During the next 12 months, do you expect your (family) income to be higher or lower 
  than during the past year? 
 
A15a.  By about what percent do you expect your (family) income to (increase/decrease) during 
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Percent of stimulus recipients:
   Mostly Spend 19 22 25 13 23 30
   Mostly Save 27 23 25 33 31 29
   Mostly Pay Debt 53 55 50 54 46 41
Percent of all respondents:
   D i d  n o t  r e c e i v e   9 1 9 2 0 3 43 46 6




Table 1: Distribution of Responses to Stimulus
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.  All 
tabulations and regressions in the paper use the household head weight, which is nonzero for household heads or their 
spouses.  This is the same weight used in the Index of Consumer Sentiment that is published monthly from the survey 
results.  There were 982 adult-household heads or spouses who participated in the May/July 2009 surveys, 990 in the 
Nov/Dec 2008 surveys, and 980 in the May/June 2008.  Tabulations of stimulus recipients in the top panel exclude 





Percent of stimulus recipients:
   Employer already changed 38 40 35
   Employer did not change 45 42 48
   Don't know if changed 12 12 11
   Self-employed (volunteered) 6 6 6
Table 2: Already Lower Withholding?
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of 590 individuals in the May and July 
2009 Surveys of Consumers who reported a use for the lower withholding.  






Percent w/ Lower 
Withholding




Withholding is now lower?
   Yes 40 100 10
   No / Don't know 60 0 15
Heard about credit previously?
   Yes 61 48 15
   No / Don't know 39 19 9
Expect credit to be extended?
   Yes 44 43 12
   No / Don't know 56 32 13
Table 3:  Mostly-Spend Rates by Awareness of 2009 Withholding Change
0.14
0.14
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of individuals who reported a use for the lower withholding.  The response 
to the first question includes 552 (non self-employed) individuals in May and July 2009.  The second and third 




Percent of Stimulus 
Recipients
2009 Tax Credit: 
Lower Withholding
2008 Tax    
Rebate
Age of respondent
   Under 40 31 24
   40 - 64 62 50
   65 and over 8 26
Household income
   Under $35,000 21 32
   $35,001 to $75,000 35 35
   More than $75,000 44 33
Personal finances 
compared to a year ago
   Better 24 20
   Same 21 25
   Worse 55 54
Percent of Stimulus Recipients
Table 4:  Demographics of Stimulus Recipients in 2009 Surveys
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of the May and July 2009 Surveys of 
Consumers.     
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Spend Save Pay Debt
No 
Rebate p-value
Age of respondent (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Rebates: Inteview May-June 2008
   Under 30 8% 9 14 51 3 12%
   30-39  18% 25 43 97 12 15%
   49-49 23% 29 48 110 31 16% 0.002
   50-64 28% 44 61 128 31 19%
   65 and over 23% 62 70 71 16 30%
Rebates: Interview November-December 2008
   Under 30 8% 6 12 35 20 11%
   30-39  18% 25 31 94 20 17%
   49-49 21% 41 31 93 40 25% 0.059
   50-64 29% 46 47 122 66 21%
   65 and over 24% 49 59 80 45 26%
Rebates: Interview May-July 2009
   Under 30 5% 15 9 16 6 37%
   30-39  17% 28 38 76 22 20%
   49-49 21% 32 33 86 47 21% 0.138
   50-64 31% 54 44 128 72 24%
   65 and over 26% 58 61 73 51 30%
Withholding: Interview May-July 2009
   Under 30 5% 6 13 24 2 14%
   30-39  17% 20 44 83 17 14%
   49-49 21% 14 53 103 30 8% 0.270
   50-64 31% 27 70 111 83 13%
   65 and over 26% 11 23 13 201 23%





 Note: Authors' weighted tabulations.  Column A is percent of all respondents to the survey in each age group 
regardless of whether they receive the stimulus or not.  Column F is percent of stimulus recipients who plan to 
mostly spend the additional income.     
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Spend Save Pay Debt
No 
Rebate p-value
Household income (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Rebates: May-June 2008
$0 to $20,000 15% 18 22 90 16 14%
$20,001 to $35,000 17% 37 42 78 3 23%
$35,001 to $50,000 13% 23 27 73 2 18% 0.462
$50,001 to $75,000 18% 31 54 81 4 19%
More than $75,000 32% 46 74 118 63 19%
Refused / Don't know 
income 6% 13 16 22 5 26%
Rebates: November-December 2008
$0 to $20,000 15% 20 14 67 44 20%
$20,001 to $35,000 16% 29 25 78 21 22%
$35,001 to $50,000 14% 21 36 65 8 17% 0.208
$50,001 to $75,000 17% 27 33 95 13 17%
More than $75,000 33% 59 58 106 92 26%
Refused / Don't know 
income 5% 11 13 13 14 30%
Rebates: May-July 2009
$0 to $20,000 17% 25 25 60 50 22%
$20,001 to $35,000 14% 31 21 68 14 26%
$35,001 to $50,000 13% 23 21 67 17 21% 0.775
$50,001 to $75,000 16% 34 36 70 16 24%
More than $75,000 34% 66 71 98 87 28%
Refused / Don't know 
income 6% 11 12 16 17 27%
Withholding: May-July 2009
$0 to $20,000 17% 6 9 36 109 12%
$20,001 to $35,000 14% 10 21 44 62 13%
$35,001 to $50,000 13% 12 14 58 42 14% 0.728
$50,001 to $75,000 16% 15 39 75 26 12%
More than $75,000 34% 33 113 116 56 13%
Refused / Don't know 
income 6% 2 7 8 39 12%






 Note: Authors' weighted tabulations.  Column A is percent of all respondents to the survey in each income group 
regardless of whether they receive the stimulus or not.  Column F is percent of stimulus recipients who plan to 
mostly spend the additional income.     
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2009 Tax Credit: 
Lower Withholding
2008 Tax    
Rebate
Percent of stimulus recipients:
   Mostly spend 12 23
   Mostly save 31 24
   Mostly pay debt 56 53
Table 7: Distribution of Responses for Recipients of Both Policies
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of the May and July 2009 Surveys of 
Consumers.  There were 471 adult-household heads or spouses who reported a 







2008 Tax   
Rebate
Percent of stimulus recipients:
   Mostly spend 30 32 31
   Mostly save 29 26 24
   Mostly pay debt 41 41 46
Table 8: Distribution of Responses to 2009 Retiree Payment
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of the May and July 2009 Surveys of 
Consumers.  There were 356 adult-household heads or spouses who 
reported a use for the retiree payment and 282 households  who received (or 








2008 Tax    
Rebate
Percent of stimulus recipients:
   Mostly spend 12 24 23
   Mostly save 32 30 25
   Mostly pay debt 56 46 52
Table 9: Distribution of Responses for Recipients of All Three Policies
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of the May and July 2009 Surveys of Consumers.  There were 
384 adult-household heads or spouses who reported a use for each of the three forms of stimulus.   
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2009 Tax Credit: 
Lower Withholding






Percent mostly spend 13 22 30 23
Percent by form of delivery
    Lower withholding 100 0 0 0
    One-time payment 0 100 100 100
Percent by timing of survey response
    Contemporaneous 100 36 100 100
    Six months after receipt 0 32 0 0
    Twelve months after receipt 0 32 0 0
Percent hypothetical payment 0 0 0 100
Dollar value of stimulus (imputed annual)
   Mean 602 1019 250 250
   Standard deviation 271 605 0 0
   Mean percent of annual income 1.2 2.4 1.0 0.5
Current finances compared to a year ago
   Better off 24 23 15 23
   Same 21 22 33 21
   Worse off  55 55 52 56
Expected income growth g
   g >= 4% 24 24 14 23
   4% > g > 0% 24 28 22 23
   g = 0% 23 25 33 24
   0% > g > -10% 18 16 24 18
   g <= -10% 12 8 7 13
State unemployment rate near time of reciept
   Mean (Percent) 9.3 5.3 9.5 9.3
   Standard deviation 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.8
Number of  observations 590 2,358 356 609
Table continued
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of the May and June 2008, Nov. and Dec. 2008, and May and July 2009 surveys.  
Variables with comparisons over "last year" or "next year" are also measured relative to the interview month--and not 
necessarily the month of stimulus receipt.  The state unemployment rate for the 2008 rebates is measured at May 2008 and for 
the 2009 policies at May 2009.  The telephone area codes at the time of the interview are used to determine state of residence.  
Table 10: Characteristics in the Regression Sample
  
  45
2009 Tax Credit: 
Lower Withholding






Percent married 68 62 51 64
Percent have children in household 42 36 7 43
Percent by age of respondent (head or spouse)
   Under age 30 7 8 2 6
   Age 30 to 39 24 19 2 25
   Age 40 to 49 28 21 7 28
   Age 50 to 64 34 28 23 35
   Age 65 and over 8 24 65 5
   Did not report age 0 0 1 0
Percent by household income
   Less than $20,000 8 14 31 9
   $20,001 to $35,000 12 17 21 11
   $35,001 to $50,000 14 15 14 13
   $50,001 to $75,000 21 19 11 19
   More than $75,000 43 29 14 44
   Did not report income 3 5 10 4
Percent by household stock wealth
   None 25 34 53 27
   $1 to $15,000 17 14 9 15
   $15,001 to $50,000 16 13 5 16
   $50,001 to $100,000 12 10 8 10
   $100,001 to $250,000 12 10 7 12
   More than $250,000 8 7 8 10
   Did not report stock value 9 10 9 10
   Did not report if stockowner 1 2 2 1
Percent with interview in 2009 100 32 100 100
Number of  observations 590 2,358 356 609
Table 10: Characteristics in the Regression Sample - Continued
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of the May and June 2008, Nov. and Dec. 2008, and May and July 2009 surveys.  
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( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Constant 23.5 24.9 15.9 27.1 13.4
(1.3) (2.4) (5.3) (8.0) (5.7)
Lower withholding -10.9 -12.0 -9.1 -15.2 -5.6
(1.7) (2.1) (2.0) (3.2) (3.8)
Contemporaneous (omitted)
Six months after receipt -0.6 0.3 0.7 2.2
(2.0) (1.8) (1.7) (1.8)
Twelve months after receipt 2.7 3.6 4.3 5.9
(1.9) (2.0) (2.0) (2.1)
Stimulus as percent of annual income -1.1 -0.9 -0.3 0.7 0.4
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (1.7) (0.6)
Hypothetical payment -1.2 -2.1 1.4 -3.9
(2.3) (2.4) (2.6) (3.1)
Better off financially than last year -3.7 -1.9 -3.5 -0.04
(2.6) (2.6) (4.1) (2.7)
Same financially as last year (omitted)
Worse off financially than last year -6.6 -5.8 -6.8 -4.7
(2.2) (2.2) (2.7) (2.1)
Expected income growth over next year
   g >= 4% -2.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.9
(2.4) (2.5) (4.0) (2.5)
   4% > g > 0% 0 . 11 . 11 . 81 . 3
(2.4) (2.4) (4.0) (2.4)
   g = 0% (omitted)
   0% > g > -10% -1.5 -1.3 0.2 -2.4
(2.6) (2.6) (3.2) (2.6)
   g <= -10% -7.8 -6.4 -6.3 -5.1
(3.1) (2.9) (4.3) (3.0)
State unemployment rate 0.6 0.5 -0.3 0.2
(0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.8)
Regression sample
   Includes 2008 tax rebates Yes Yes Yes No Yes
   Includes 2009 change in withholding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
   Includes 2009 one-time payments 
      (retiree and hypothetical) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
   Controls for demographics No  No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,913 3,913 3,913 1,555 2,948
Number of respondents 2,592 2,592 2,592 968 2,477
Table 11: Pooled Regression of Stimulus Spend Rates
Mostly Spend Stimulus, Pooled
Table continued
Note: Regressions are weighted.  Dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent reports mostly 
spending the stimulus income and zero if the respondent reports mostly saving or mostly paying off 
debt.  All coefficients in the table are multiplied by 100, so the estimates are expressed in percentage 
points.  Pooled linear regressions have standard errors clustered on individuals in the first 
specification and clustered on states in the rest of the specifications.  Estimates in bold are 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level.   
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( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Married 2.6 4.5 2.2
(1.9) (2.7) (1.9)
Have children in household -0.1 5.1 -2.5
(2.2) (3.1) (2.3)
Under age 30 (omitted)
Age 30 to 39 -0.4 0.0 -1.3
(4.0) (6.5) (4.0)
Age 40 to 49 -0.6 -4.6 -0.4
(3.8) (6.2) (3.9)
Age 50 to 64 2.7 4.2 0.6
(4.0) (6.4) (4.1)
Age 65 and over 9.5 8.3 8.6
(4.4) (6.9) (4.5)
Did not report age 0.4 -0.2 -5.6
(14.2) (15.2) (12.7)
Household income
   $20,000 or less (omitted)
   $20,001 to $35,000 2.1 0.9 5.8
(3.3) (5.6) (3.5)
   $35,001 to $50,000 -1.1 -1.0 3.1
(3.7) (6.5) (3.9)
   $50,001 to $75,000 -2.5 -5.9 3.7
(3.8) (6.6) (4.1)
   More than $75,000 1.6 0.3 6.4
(4.1) (7.1) (4.5)
   Did not report income 0.4 -4.2 7.7
(5.2) (8.7) (5.7)
Household stock wealth
   No stock wealth (omitted)
   $1 to $15,000 -0.3 0.5 -1.2
(2.7) (4.1) (2.7)
   $15,001 to $50,000 3.8 8.3 2.3
(2.9) (4.7) (2.9)
   $50,001 to $100,000 2.6 7.2 -0.4
(3.0) (4.7) (3.1)
   $100,001 to $250,000 1.7 3.1 0.7
(3.1) (4.5) (3.1)
   More than $250,000 7.8 7.0 8.6
(4.0) (5.6) (4.0)
   Did not report stock value 2.9 2.5 3.1
(3.1) (4.5) (3.2)
   Did not report if stockowner 6.3 23.3 -1.1
(6.3) (12.3) (6.1)
Table 11: Pooled Regression of Stimulus Spend Rates - Continued
Mostly Spend Stimulus, Pooled
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Percent of Individuals Who




Mostly spent this one-time payment, but       
mostly saved/paid debt with lower withholding 14 13
Mostly saved/paid debt with this one-time 
payment, but mostly spent lower withholding 3 4
Reported different forms of "economic" saving 15 11
Had the same response to both programs 68 72
Memo:
   Number of respondents 471 241
Table 12: Comparison of Individual Responses Across Policies
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of the May and July 2009 surveys for the tax rebates and July 
2009 for the hypothetical retiree payments.   
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Economic conditions and/or personal 
finances worse than last year 47 0
Difference in the delivery of the extra 
income (gradual versus lump-sum) 23 36
Difference in the amount of the extra 
income 3 33
Had a particular spending need or use 
for one-time payment 19 12
Save some / spend some, Spend since 
income is unexpected 0 15
Don't know why different response 8 3
Memo:
   Number of respondents 64 33
Note: Authors' weighted tabulations of the May and July 2009 surveys.
Percent of Group
Table 13: Free-Response Reason for Different Use
Reason Spent One-Time Payment, But 























Nominal share of new 
vehicle purchases 
induced by stimulus 
payments
4




Apr 203.7 23.3 4.0 0.02
May 197.9 577.1 90.8 0.46
Jun 186.4 334.4 157.2 0.84
Jul 167.3 164.1 82.4 0.49
Aug 193.2 12.4 28.3 0.15
Sep 176.3 8.1 4.0 0.02
Oct 151.3 11.7 3.7 0.02
Nov 149.5 13.1 5.1 0.03
Dec 149.2 2.6 2.6 0.02
2008 184.9 95.6 31.5 0.17
1 Source: BEA.
2 Source: Daily Treasury Statements.
Table 14: Estimated Impact of 2008 Stimulus Payments on New Vehicle Purchases      
Based on PSJM (2011) Results
(nominal billion dollars, annual rate)
3 The estimated average share of the stimulus payments spent on new vehicle purchases within three months 
of stimulus receipt is 0.357 (standard error 0.204) in Table 12 in PSJM.  There are no spending effects in Table 
12 after the first three months, so following PSJM, we assume that the contemporaneous share of 0.357 is spent 
evenly in the month of stimulus receipt and the subsequent month.  For the seasonal adjustment of stimulus-
induced spending, we use the FRB's seasonal factors for total light vehicle sales, which range in this period 
4 Ratio of column (3) to column (1).  The average estimated nominal share of new vehicle purchases due to the 
stimulus payments is one third in 2008:Q2 to 2008:Q3.   The 90% confidence interval for this nominal share 
(using only the standard error on the PSJM point estimate and not any sampling error in the data) ranges from 
near 0 to almost two-thirds.    
 
 